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ABSTRACT 
The Conservation Reserve Program was first established by the Food Security 
Act of 1985, with the primary purpose of preventing damage to highly erodible soils, 
made worse by intensified farming practices. Since its inception, the CRP has grown to 
become the largest federal, private-land retirement program in the United States with an 
approximately $2 billion annual budget. The Agricultural Act of 2014 mandates a 
reduction in the enrollment cap from 32 million acres to 24 million acres by 2018. The 
reduction coupled with the higher than average commodity prices makes the decision of 
whether or not to reenroll in to the CRP a difficult one for producers with expiring land. 
Expiring lands will equal almost 2 million acres in the year 2015, and approximately 7.1 
million acres over the life of the farm bill. 
This research will develop a computer based decision aid that incorporates all 
major aspects of the decision when considering enrollment in the CRP, to be used by 
landowners and producers. These considerations include eligibility, the Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI), the producers bid level, and evaluation of practice options within 
the CRP and options outside the CRP. The goals of this research are to produce a 
computer web based decision aid, as described above, with specific emphasis on a few 
key outputs. These include a probability of acceptance measure, the Net Present Value of 
all options available to the landowner/manager, and a measure of what that 
landowner’s/manager’s optimal bid is. 
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The methodology of this study relies on the use of simulation using the excel 
add-in Simetar. Users of the program are allowed to enter details about the land being 
considered for CRP enrollment that the decision aid then uses to test scenarios for the 
land. Five hundred randomized point estimates are generated and compiled as a 
cumulative distribution function comparison chart, stoplight chart, and several other 
customized output representations for the user’s consideration. 
This thesis details a test of an Agriculture and Food Policy Center representative 
farm. The results, given the input data taken from the farm, suggest that the least risky 
option for this farm with the highest net returns is to enroll the land in CRP. It is 
important to note that this is simply a test of one farm and not a recommendation for all 
producers. Also, the results could be changed given different assumptions about the 
producer’s goals. 
The study concludes that including risk in the decision making process regarding 
CRP enrollment is a critical factor when determining the most financially rewarding 
result. Including riskiness in the decision making process warrants the use of a decision 
tool, like the one presented in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Conservation Reserve Program was established by the Food Security Act of 
1985, with the primary purpose of preventing damage to highly erodible soils, made 
worse by intensified farming practices. Since its inception, the CRP has grown to 
become the largest federal, private-land retirement program in the United States (Stubbs, 
2014) with an approximately $2 billion annual budget. 
At the end of 2014, approximately 24.2 million acres were enrolled in the CRP 
(FSA Monthly Summary, Dec 2014), with 77 percent of these acres being General Sign-
up land, enrolled through a competitive bid process, and the other 23 percent being 
enrolled under Continuous Sign-up, targeting the specific needs of states and special 
goals of the federal government. 
Since its inception, the CRP has grown to target much more than simply erodible 
soil. The CRP Annual Summary and Enrollment Statistics for FY 2012 estimates that 
runoff of nitrogen and phosphorus were decreased by 95 percent and 86 percent, 
respectively, compared to runoff levels had the CRP not been implemented. CRP 
reduces water pollution, and reduces hypoxic zones, particularly in the Gulf of Mexico. 
The annual CRP report also estimates that there are approximately 2 million 
additional ducks/year added to the flock due to improved nesting provided by the CRP in 
the Prairie Pothole Region. In addition, the endangered sage grouse and lesser prairie 
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chicken have both seen an increase in numbers since the establishment of the CRP. Also, 
bobwhite quail density in upland buffers, a CRP management cover crops are 70-72 
percent greater than on cropped land, and estimates show that a 4 percent increase in 
CRP land in a region can increase ring-neck pheasant numbers by as much as 22 percent. 
CRP land reduces greenhouse gas emission levels. Estimates indicate that CRP 
land has removed 49 million tons of CO2 from the atmosphere. The reduction comes 
through the reduction of fuel use and nutrient runoff from fertilizer application, as well 
as CRP land itself serving as a carbon sink. The aggregate benefits of CRP equate to an 
estimated decrease of 9.6 million cars on the road (Conservation Reserve Program 
Annual Summary and Enrollment Statistics, 2012). 
On top of all of these environmental benefits, the CRP has reduced “surplus” 
crops and boosted crop prices, provided stable income to landowners and producers, and 
bolstered regional economies through hunting and recreation. But CRP enrollment has 
also prevented more land from being planted when crop prices were record high. 
The Agricultural Act of 2014 mandates a reduction in the enrollment cap from 32 
million acres to 24 million acres by 2018. The cap reduction coupled with the higher 
than average commodity prices makes the decision of whether or not to reenroll land 
into the CRP a very difficult decision for producers with expiring land. Expiring lands 
will equal almost 2 million acres in the year 2015 alone, and approximately 7.1 million 
acres over the life of the farm bill (Conservation Reserve Program Statistics). 
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This research develops a computer based decision aid that incorporates all major 
aspects of the decision when considering enrollment in the CRP, to be used by 
landowners and producers. These considerations include eligibility, the Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI), the producers bid level, and evaluation of practice options within 
the CRP and options outside the CRP. 
The goals of this research are to produce a computer web based decision aid, as 
described above, with specific emphasis on a few key output variables. These include a 
probability of acceptance measure, the Net Present Value of all options available to the 
landowner/manager, and a measure of what that landowner’s/manager’s optimal bid is. 
4 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
History of the CRP 
The history of land retirement programs in the United States dates to the 1930’s, 
but they did not begin with the goal of preserving sensitive land. The 1930’s were an era 
of financial hardship for most American’s, and in particular, for those who lived in rural 
areas. Not only was the Great Depression at its peak, but the Dust Bowl was in full 
swing in the plains. According to “History and Outlook for Farm Bill Conservation 
Programs,” by Cain and Lovejoy 2005, in the 1930’s approximately one in four 
Americans lived on farms, and an even greater percentage had incomes tied directly, or 
indirectly to farming. Yields were poor, and rural incomes showed it, dropping 52 
percent from 1929 to 1933 (Cain and Lovejoy 2004). Poverty, along with other major 
concerns regarding agriculture led President Roosevelt’s Secretary of Agriculture, Henry 
A. Wallace, to produce the first “Farm Bill”, called “The Agricultural Adjustment Act 
(AAA)”. 
The administration sought a way to support farmer incomes without using direct 
payments, as money being handed directly to individuals would have been politically 
impossible, and this led to the first real wave of land retirement. The AAA created a 
parity price for farmers. It guaranteed that, as long as you participated in voluntary 
production reduction programs, including acreage set-asides, the price you received 
would not fall below a set level based on parity to the 1910-1914 period. This program 
was not to last, as it was funded by a tax levied on processing of the commodities; a tax 
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that was eventually passed on to consumers. “In 1936 this tax was declared 
unconstitutional on the grounds that Congress had passed a tax that was beneficial to one 
segment of the nation – the farmer – while causing detriment to everyone else.” (Cain 
and Lovejoy 2004) 
Congress’ ruling led to the first real push towards large-scale conservation 
programs. Before the finalization of the Supreme Court case, Wallace developed the Soil 
Conservation Act (SCA) of 1935. This method of getting cash to producers wasn’t 
challenged, and became the most significant method of support and surplus reduction in 
the 1936 Farm Bill. Unfortunately, Wallace’s SCA did not work as expected, and the 
cause was partly of his own doing. A huge supporter of science in agriculture, Wallace 
also supplied government funding for science and technology to advance the farming 
industry. This funding, which enhanced yields, led to significant slippage. Slippage can 
be described as a smaller reduction in production than expected from removing a certain 
amount of acres from production. In fact, due to the new tech and focused production on 
reduced acres, surpluses increased significantly following the 1936 Farm Bill. 
Technology driven production gains exceeded the production of acres idled. 
A few other adjustments were made to conservation initiatives prior to 1950, but 
due to the war-time economy and the need for more food production, focus shifted away 
from acreage controls for the majority of the 1940’s. Focus returned to conservation in 
1956 with the passing of the Agricultural Act of 1956, which created the Soil Bank. The 
purpose of the Soil Bank was to, “[D]eal with the stifling effects of erosion that 
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threatened the welfare of every American and disrupted markets and commerce on the 
whole” (Can and Lovejoy 2004). The Soil Bank was made up of two programs, the 
Acreage Reserve Program and, in its first real iteration, the Conservation Reserve 
Program. “The conservation reserve program called for a three-year contract wherein the 
government would pay for land improvements that increased soil, water, forestry, and 
wildlife quality if the farmer would agree not to harvest or graze contracted land” (Cain 
and Lovejoy 2004). The Soil Bank resulted in some unintended consequences that would 
affect future land retirement programs. The act devastated rural economies focused on 
agricultural processing and farming. Vast amounts of land were removed from 
production in concentrated areas, effectively killing the processing industries that 
depended on through-put from the agricultural industry. This led to the 25 percent limit 
on acreage enrollment in a single county, which will be discussed later in the paper. 
The 1980’s were the first time that conservation concerns began for the sole sake 
of conservation itself, without the explicit inclusion of price or supply control. The Food 
Security Act of 1985 was the first to have a conservation title, and it included the 
creation of the Conservation Reserve Program as its own program, and the creation of 
Conservation Compliance. The first Conservation Reserve Program signup aimed at 
enrolling 40-45 million acres of highly erodible land, and was managed strictly on the 
goals of preventing erosion. This act included a provision allowing no more than 25 
percent of acres in a county to be enrolled, to protect rural economies. Conservation 
compliance put regulations on land conversion and other practices in order for farmers to 
participate in farm programs. 
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The Conservation Reserve Program has undergone changes to its structure since 
1985, but the overall idea has remained largely the same. In the Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, CRP saw a refocusing to include benefits to water, 
and created the first version of the Environmental Benefits Index (EBI). According to, 
“Conservation Reserve Program: Annual Summary and Enrollment Statistics FY 2012,” 
the EBI was later amended in the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 
1996 to include emphasis on wildlife benefits equal to those gained by water and 
reduced soil erosion. The 1996 farm bill also led to the creation of the first continuous 
CRP sign ups. Continuous sign ups target specific state environmental issues and focus 
on aligning successes at the state level with the overall federal program. The Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 saw the creation of the, 4-of-6 previous year 
cropping rule, included provisions for non-emergency harvesting of CRP land, and 
expanded the Farmable Wetlands Program, enacted the year before, to all 48 contiguous 
states. Finally, in the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, the acreage cap was 
decreased to 32 million acres. 
The Agricultural Act of 2014 saw few significant changes to the CRP, mostly 
related to severe droughts occurring in Texas and California, and severe flooding in the 
Midwest. The first notable change was that emergency haying/grazing on CRP was now 
allowed with reduced or no penalty.  In, “Conservation Reserve Program (CRP): Status 
and Issues,”  Megan Stubbs of the Economic Research Service says that use of CRP land 
forage due to drought or flood, seasonal use of vegetative buffer practices, and grazing 
for a beginning farmer/rancher will be allowed with no penalty. However, managed 
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harvesting, commercial use, grazing for invasive species, routine grazing, and wind 
turbine establishment on land in the CRP will all be penalized 25 percent of their annual 
payment/acre. Many of these provisions came from the 2014 elimination of the 
Grassland Reserve Program. The 2014 farm bill included a provision allowing early non-
penalty termination of CRP contracts if the land has been enrolled for over five years, 
and is not considered “environmentally sensitive”. Lastly, in a continuing trend, the 2014 
Farm Bill decreased the acreage cap of the CRP from 32 million to 24 million acres by 
2018. 
Operation of the CRP 
The description of the CRP on the USDA Farm Service Agency website is, “In 
exchange for a yearly rental payment, farmers enrolled in the program agree to remove 
environmentally sensitive land from agricultural production and plant species that will 
improve environmental health and quality.” In reality, the program is much more 
focused and intensive than this simple description leads one to believe, and has multiple 
initiatives working to specifically address the health of the environment, while balancing 
the needs of producers. 
The CRP is administered by the Farm Service Administration (FSA) with support 
from other governmental agencies, primarily the Natural Resource Conservation Service 
(NRCS), and is funded by the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). It is the largest 
federal/private land retirement program, and widely considered to be one of the most 
successful. 
9 
The first consideration when looking at the CRP is determining what land is 
eligible. The first condition actually applies to the producer themselves. In order for a 
producer to be deemed ‘eligible’ for CRP they, “…must be an owner, operator, or tenant 
of the land for at least 12 months prior to the close of the CRP sign-up period, and show 
control of the land for the duration of the contract” (Stubbs 2014). There are special 
considerations that can get around this rule, but in general, it applies to all producers. 
The basic idea is to prevent people from buying land specifically for CRP enrollment. 
Considerations for land eligibility are more extensive. In general, the land must be: 
 Highly erodible
 Marginal pasture land
 Grasslands in areas that could provide habitat for ecologically significant plant
and animal populations if maintained/returned to grassland
 Land to be enrolled in a riparian buffer
Each of these eligibility criteria have specific caveats that apply to them, ensuring 
that the land is used to its highest environmental potential, but in general, land must meet 
one of the above criteria in order to be eligible for enrollment. It is important to note that 
land is enrolled in one type of CRP ‘practice’ which is implemented via a plan created in 
conjunction with the farmer and FSA. The top five CRP practices are listed in Table 2.1. 
The established practice is voluntary, unless the specific ‘initiative’ a producer is 
enrolling in requires the establishment of a specific type of cover. 
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There are two ways to ‘opt in’ to the CRP. The first is through the general sign-
up. The general sign-up is the largest portion of the CRP, and accounts for 19.7 million 
acres, or 77 percent of all land enrolled in CRP (Stubbs 2014). It operates on a 
competitive bid process, whereby farmers submit a bid to the FSA and, based on their 
bid and environmental factors, the FSA either accepts or rejects their enrollment. 
General enrollment occurs during set time periods, and the next period begins on 
December 1, 2015, and ends February 26, 2016. 
The second way to enroll land in the CRP is to work through the continuous sign-
up. Continuous sign-ups are non-competitive and target the most environmentally 
sensitive land under specific needs of the state. These sign-ups include special signing 
and enrollment incentives to encourage participation. Continuous sign-ups account for 
23 percent of CRP enrollment, or approximately 5.75 million acres. The largest two 
‘initiatives’ under this sign-up are the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program 
(CREP), and the Farmable Wetlands Program (FWP). These two initiatives account for 
1.6 million acres of CRP enrollment. 
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Table 2.2 is a detailed description of how payments work for each sign-up and 
initiative. 
CRP payments to participants are based on a few factors that are discussed in 
detail later in this review, however, it is important to note that the payments cannot 
exceed the Maximum Acceptable Rental Rate (MARR), which is based on a calculation 
of the county average rental rate, taken from the National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
and takes in to consideration the soil productivity. 
CRP is not in a sense ‘binding’ for the duration of the contract, as there are 
provisions for removing your land from the program. These provisions allow for the 
removal of land with some financial penalties. First, upon removal of land from the 
program, it is necessary to repay all financial incentives and one time payments in full, 
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with interest, and second, 25 percent of the rental payments received must be returned to 
the government. 
Taxes on CRP payments are a timely issue. In October 2014, Morehouse v. 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue was decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit. In 1994, Morehouse inherited a large amount of land in South 
Dakota, and in 1997, after renting out a portion of the land to producers, and maintaining 
a portion in existing CRP contracts, chose to enroll another portion in the CRP. In an 
excerpt from the Decision on the case the circuit judge states: 
Morehouse received CRP payments of $37,872 in both 2006 and 2007. The 
Morehouses timely filed tax return forms for both years and identified their occupations 
as “self-employed.” On Schedules E of their tax returns, the Morehouses listed the CRP 
payments for both years as “rents received,” and thus the CRP payments were not taxed 
as self-employment income. On October 14, 2010, the Internal Revenue Service 
Commissioner (Commissioner) mailed to the Morehouses a notice of deficiency for 
2006 and 2007. The notice stated the CRP payments should have been reported as 
income on a Schedule F, Profit or Loss From Farming, and were thus unreported self-
employment income, which should have been taxed.  
The Morehouses petitioned the Tax Court, which upheld the Commissioner’s 
claim, and the Morehouses in turn appealed the decision of the Tax Court. Eventually, 
the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit overturned the ruling based on the 
fact that, “…2006 and 2007 CRP payments were “considered paid [by the government] 
for the use [and occupancy] of [Morehouse’s] property” and thus constituted rentals 
from real estate fully within the meaning of § 1402(a)(1).” (Morehouse v. Commissioner, 
2014) This means there are two methods of taxation for CRP revenue. If you are an 
active producer, revenue is subject to the 15.3 percent self-employment tax, however if 
you are a ‘non-farmer’ with land enrolled in the CRP, the money is not subject to the tax. 
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CRP Acreage 
CRP is impacted by a myriad of forces, and can be significantly changed 
following upturns or downturns in prices, large environmental changes, or government 
program adjustments. Figure 2.1 shows the annual enrollment by acres from the CRPs 
inception to 2013. Note that in 2013 CRP acreage was the lowest it has been since pre-
1990. 
The most recent downturn in CRP enrollment follows a significant increase in 
commodity prices that began in late 2006. The upturn in commodity prices can be 
attributed to the aggressive increases in the Renewable Fuel Standard’s (RFS) volume 
requirements from 9 billion gallons in 2008 to 36 billion gallons by 2022 (H.R. 6, 2007), 
the sudden onset of drought in the Midwest and Texas during the 2010s, and higher 
14 
production costs. Higher production costs and drought cut corn supplies while the RFS 
rapidly boosted demand for corn for ethanol production. Higher crop prices, especially 
corn, meant there was less incentive for farmers to keep their land out of production if 
CRP rental rates remained the same. Even though, as we will later postulate, biofuel 
commodities are not the most commonly replaced by CRP acreage, an increase in price 
would lead producers to attempt biofuel commodity production on more marginal, i.e. 
CRP qualified land.  
It should be noted that from 2008 to 2014 rental rates have, in fact, increased. 
According to data taken from the “Conservation Reserve Program Statistics” page of the 
FSA website, in 2008 the national average rental rate for cropland was $85.50/acre, 
while in 2014 that rate had increased to $141/acre. In a less significant, yet similar, trend 
the national average rental rate for pastureland went from $10.50/acre in 2008 to 
$12.00/acre in 2014. While this is an increase, it is unknown if it was simply not enough 
to retain producers whose land might be highly productive, or if other factors kept them 
from the CRP. 
CRP land is concentrated in a few large areas. The heaviest concentrations are 
generally located east of the Rocky Mountain range and west of the Mississippi river, 
however lesser concentrations of CRP are found in all 48 of the lower states except for 
Arizona. Figure 2.2 contains the CRP enrollment as of 2014, based on the concentration 
of acres in a county. 
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The highest concentration of acreage enrolled in the CRP occurs in the lower 
great plains encompassing areas in Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Colorado, the Prairie 
Pothole Region, encompassing portions of Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, and 
Minnesota, and portions of Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri. 
Economics of the CRP 
There are many economic factors to take into consideration when studying the 
CRP. In, “The Influence of Rising Commodity Prices on the CRP,” Hellerstein and 
Malcolm (2011) used a ‘Likely to Bid’ model to study the impact of rising commodity 
prices on CRP acreage and bid pricing. They simulated, at the national level, three 
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scenarios under which commodity crop prices stayed at their established baseline (prices 
in 2005), a medium level of prices (prices in 2007), and one in which the prices 
remained at significantly high 2008 prices. They also tested two levels of Soil Rental 
Rate, the maximum level of allowable bids. The metrics they used to frame the study 
were differences in offered acres, average EBI scores (not including the cost factor of 
EBI), lost agricultural production through CRP enrollment, rental payments on an 
aggregate and per acre level, and regional distribution of acres. Their results indicated 
that higher crop prices were significant determinants of CRP bid prices. “[C]ommodity 
price changes influence not only the amount but the quality of lands offered: their 
agricultural productivity, environmental benefits, and geographic location” (Hellerstein 
& Malcolm, 2011). 
Hellerstein and Malcolm’s findings for their baseline scenario indicate that 51.1 
million acres would be offered into CRP. In the medium price (2007 levels) they used 
two different Soil Rental Rates. These rates were the 2007 SRR, and a SRR increased by 
60 percent. With the 2007 SRR and the increased prices, the offered acres dropped to 
28.8 million. With the increased SRR, offered acres went back towards the baseline 
scenario, reaching 45 million acres. Their results when conducting the high level price 
scenario, with an SRR increased by 120 percent from the baseline were similar to the 
increased SRR findings of the 2007 price level study. 
SRR increases could help to combat price increases in commodities, and 
Hellerstein and Malcolm’s work corroborates that evidence. Hellerstein and Malcolm’s 
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model also gives an explanation as to why CRP acreage has decreased, despite increases 
in SRRs. Hellerstein and Malcolm did not have a, “…straightforward [method] to 
predict what rental rates would be under different commodity price regimes,” so they 
simply chose the 60 percent and 120 percent across the board increases. “Actual CRP 
rental rates increased by… 20 percent between 2008 and 2010.” (Hellerstein and 
Malcolm, 2011) This provides insight as to why their predictions did not materialize, as 
the increase in payments was substantially less than the increases assumed in the study.  
Changes in crop prices not only impact quantity of land enrolled in CRP, but also 
its locale and EBI scores. Hellerstein and Malcolm estimate that if prices stayed at 2007 
levels, the costs of the program would double. Hellerstein and Malcolm also postulate 
that while this empirical analysis has held mostly true, variances in their results could be 
a result of the popularity of the program itself. Essentially, the popularity of the CRP 
program might mean that token increases in rental rates may keep producers in the 
program, even if it doesn’t explicitly meet their best financial interest. Overall, 
Hellerstein and Malcolm find that, “Higher crop prices, as observed in summer 2008… 
are likely to sway some landowners in favor of agricultural production over 
conservation,” and that, “[C]ommodity price changes influence not only the amount but 
the quality of lands offered[.]” 
Sullivan et al. (2002), forecast the use of land were it to leave CRP. They first 
determined what factors influence the land use choice. Three factors; the type of cover 
used when the land is in CRP, the profitability of the possible uses, and the aspirations of 
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the owner, including age, wealth, and the tenure of CRP enrollment effected future land 
use. In an effort to simplify the study, aspirations of the owner were assumed away, and 
the type of CRP cover and the profitability of future uses were analyzed.  
Sullivan et al. assumed that all CRP contracts were suddenly eliminated and used 
the Likely-to-Bid model developed by the Economic Research Service (ERS) to develop 
the probability that land will switch from CRP to another use. They based their data on 
2001 prices and pre-2002 programs. They found that, when ending the CRP 
immediately, 51 percent of CRP land would return to cropland, with the highest 
concentrations of this occurring in areas the authors named, the Northern Plains 
Crescent, which encompasses parts of Montana, North and South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin, the Southern Plains Ellipse, which includes portions of eastern Colorado, 
western Kansas, western Oklahoma, and the Texas Panhandle, and the Southwestern 
Corn Belt, which includes northern Missouri, southern Iowa, and eastern Illinois. The 
national average of 51percent is lower than found in previous studies, but they assume 
this could be due to the lack of personal information, or to the inclusion of new 
assumptions on land rigidity as a good. Figure 2.3 contains an ERS estimate of what 
would happen to lands under the assumption that the CRP suddenly expired.  
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Increasing population pressure, along with a demand for higher standards of 
living in the developing world, is driving a need for more food, and therefore more 
places to grow it. In, “Is America Running out of Farmland?” Gottlieb addresses this 
concern by studying historical trends in population growth and land use.  
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 Gottlieb discusses the dire predictions of a 1981 study that claims there is need 
for approximately 77 million acres of additional farmland to keep up with population 
growth. The fallacy of this argument is that it suffers from the Malthusian problem. The 
study assumed a straight line in both population growth and food supply growth, 
although is technology may be actually increasing yields on the same amount of land. 
Even with the worst-case ‘straight-line’ scenario, the farmland ‘cap’ would not be 
reached until, at the earliest 2051, but with some estimates ranging all the way to the 
year 4000 (Gottlieb). The result is that the urban sprawl problem, and the loss of 
production land is not a ‘real’ problem. 
 Another issue that Gottlieb focuses on that is pertinent to the study of the CRP, is 
that market forces, along with technology will continue to provide adequate farmland. 
What this means is that, as the prices for commodities rise, as discussed previously, land 
will move away from uses like conservation towards production, as government 
subsidies are unable to keep up with the market price of commodities. Gottlieb points 
out that the problem of farmland loss cannot be looked at as an aggregate, because 
transportation costs become an issue. With farmland in New Jersey cited as rapidly 
decreasing, the cost of transporting food to that region will go up, as the distance from 
food increases. This may, Gottlieb theorizes, drive local parcels that are enrolled in uses, 
such as CRP, out of those programs and in to production, as their returns would be 
higher on the market, and still less expensive than transporting commodities over long 
distances.  
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In, “Agricultural Land Values and Rents Under the CRP,” Shoemaker theorized 
that CRP might increase land values over time. The formula used to evaluate this claim 
was simple: 
Impact on Farm Income = CRP Pmt. – Cover Establishment – Loss from 
Decreased Production  
Shoemaker (1989) found that, with the CRP functioning as an annuity, the value has 
been bid-up by farmers and landowners treating enrolled land the same way they would 
treat a bond. Shoemaker stated that, “The direct effect of the CRP on eligible land 
depends on the excess beyond the minimum incentive required to induce participation in 
the program,” and “…that excess will be capitalized in to the program.” The research 
has interesting implications regarding farmer bids. According to the Shoemaker, 
“[T]here is a certain asymmetry of information regarding land quality.” In essence, the 
land owner knows a substantially greater deal about their land and its value than the 
government. This asymmetry of information allows farmers to gain ‘economic rents’. 
CRP rent is also a certain return vs. an uncertain farming return. During the first four 
sign ups, Shoemaker documented the behavior of farmers ‘bidding up’ their prices. 
“During the initial sign-up the average rental rates were lower than the bid caps in all 
regions. By the fourth sign-up, average contract rates approached or equaled the bid caps 
for all regions.” (Shoemaker, 1989) Farmers who wait to bid in to a program could 
discover their bid caps. The bid caps are now published and widely known, however it 
 22 
 
does show that farmer bidding patters do not attempt to put less valuable land at a lower 
price, but always push the limit of the bid cap or Maximum Acceptable Rental Rate.  
Jacobs, Thurman, and Marra (2011) discuss bidding practices in, “How Farmers 
Bid into the CRP: An Empirical Analysis of CRP Offers Data”. They discuss the fact 
that proposed rental rates are given negative weight in the EBI, and that the rental rate is 
what farmers base their bid on, as well as the EBI being roughly equal to a landowners 
probability of acceptance. According to Jacobs et al. producers face two problems when 
bidding. They have uncertainty about government actions and uncertainty about 
competing bids on nearby acreage. The authors develop an equation that estimates the 
level at which a bid must be accepted: 
𝑟 + 𝑏(𝑁) >  𝜋 
where r is the bid, b(N) are other benefits assumed to be increased in future farming, 
social benefits, and unquantifiable “open space” enjoyment, and π is the returns to 
farming. The data came from signup data in the 16
th
, 18
th
, and 20
th
 sign ups in the Prairie 
Pothole Region.  
The authors found that bids are clearly conditioned on the Maximum SRR. They 
also found that changes in bids are not perfectly correlated. A $1.00 increase in the 
Maximum SRR only increased average bids by $.05 to $.55. This varied slightly by 
locale, as, landowners in Iowa and, to a lesser degree, Minnesota perceive (correctly) 
that they are penalized in the EBI cost scoring for being high rent enrollments which 
leads them to bid well below their maximum rental rate in an attempt to increase their 
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probability of acceptance. The opposite case holds for landowners in low rent areas 
(Jacobs et al., 2011). Also, the authors found that a landowner with a high EBI score will 
increase their bid by more than a landowner with a lower EBI score, if both gain one 
additional EBI point. This greater increase on high EBI scores is less likely to hurt the 
high EBI’s chance of acceptance, whereas it will likely keep a lower EBI score out of the 
program.  
Williams et al. (2009) examined producer level concerns when considering the 
decision of whether or not to enroll in CRP, by conducting an empirical analysis to show 
the significance of incorporating risk when making the CRP choice. Multiple cited 
articles by the authors recommend leaving land idle at least one year after taking it out of 
the CRP to significantly increase yields. To incorporate risk, the authors conducted a 
static analysis and a stochastic analysis of several different production methods on 
sorghum-fallow and wheat-fallow rotations on an experiment station in Tribune, Kansas. 
The static study resulted in a substantial increase in income under the reduced till or no 
till methods over CRP. The stochastic study incorporates a producer’s general risk 
aversion, and found that, while conventional tilling has the highest returns to production, 
CRP has higher returns than any production methods. The authors determine that a risk 
averse/risk neutral producer will choose CRP due to their entire cumulative distribution 
function being positive under CRP, while under production, negative returns occurred.  
CRP was preferred to cropping for all producers when accounting for Absolute Risk 
Aversion Coefficient (ARAC) of greater than 0.04. Williams et al. work supported 
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incorporating risk when considering the economic CRP decision is important, as a large 
amount of CRP land is ‘marginal’ and financial losses occur frequently.  
Feng, Hennessy, and Du (2013) argue that crop insurance should be considered 
when calculating the cost portion of the EBI, as high concentrations of CRP occur in 
areas of marginal land, where crop insurance premiums are high. The potential savings 
by not having to continue subsidizing those premiums are significant, and if included in 
the EBI, areas with high premiums could have more competitive bids. This could 
effectively change the geography of the CRP.  
On a study of 12 counties in Southwest North Dakota, Bangsund, Hodur 
Leistritz, and Nudell (2011) conducted an analysis of the economic implications to an 
entire region from the reduction of CRP acreage. The authors found that, a reduction in 
CRP acreage, was correlated with significantly lower permit hunting returns, and that 
regional hunting related expenditures (i.e. hotel rooms, restaurant income) decreased. 
The authors point out that as CRP acreage decreases, there is typically a documented 
accompanying decrease in wildlife numbers. They hypothesize that the number of 
hunters and their spending decreases with fewer CRP acres. There are implications of 
‘game-theory’ complications in the study, as the authors point out that, even if a farmer 
keeps his land enrolled in CRP, overall regional habitat loss will decrease the amount of 
wildlife, and therefore it is likely that fee-hunting revenues for an individual producer 
will decrease.  
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Environmental Benefits Index 
 The Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) has become an integral part of the CRP 
since it’s development in 1990. It was developed to compare the conservation benefits 
that different offered lands provide. Heimlich (2002) details the structure of the EBI. 
There are several components of the EBI in CRP. Table 2.3 contains the points given to 
each EBI consideration.  
 
 Following the measurement of the EBI benefits, the government creates a 
national standard EBI. Typically, lands that meet this national standard are considered 
acceptable for enrollment, contingent on their bid, while parcels that do not meet this 
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EBI are not usually accepted. The most recent standard EBI equaled a score of 209. 
(Stubbs, 2014) Once the environmental EBI is calculated, the government factors in the 
cost, and an important thing to consider is the fact that while the acreage of the program 
is capped, the costs are not. The government sets a Maximum Acceptable Rental Rate 
(MARR), which is essentially truncates the distribution of CRP bidders. Those with 
acceptable EBIs and rental bids below the MARR are accepted. The easiest way to 
envision the EBI is a type of balance (Figure 2.4), with costs on one side and 
environmental considerations on the other. As your bid, accompanied by cost-sharing 
commitments from the government get ‘heavier’, your EBI must go up, and as your 
environmental benefits get ‘heavier’, you can place a higher bid.  
 
The EBI is constantly in flux, and changes based on the needs of the current 
conservation attitudes, and political pressure. “The EBI was not meant to be a rigid 
index, but to be adjusted and improved depending on the progress of sign-ups, perceived 
deficiencies, and/or changed priorities” (Ribaudo et al., 2001). The EBI is often lauded 
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as a strong example of compromise in the political/conservation spectrum. “The EBI was 
not developed solely by scientists seeking to maximize the potential benefits from the 
CRP, but by a combination of program administrators, physical scientists, social 
scientists, and politicians trying to meet the demands of diverse consumer groups, the 
needs of farmers, and the realities of implementing a massive conservation program” 
(Ribaudo et al., 2001).  
Figure 2.5 contains the average EBI score of land enrolled in the CRP as of the 
43
rd
 sign-up in 2012. As you can see, EBI scores tend to be concentrated in specific 
areas. These include the previously mentioned Southern Great Plains, the Northern 
Plains Crescent, the Southwestern Corn Belt, and the Deep South, although they all 
likely have differing environmental benefits.  
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Soil Fertility Considerations of the CRP   
 Depending on its use, land can function as a major carbon ‘sink.’ Along with 
nitrogen, these elements are essential for the healthy development of crops, and 
contribute to growth in yields. Loss of these nutrients creates the necessity for 
fertilization and therefore increases costs of production. Therefore, it is important to 
study whether or not CRP or different types of production are healthier for the soil.  
 Reeder, Schuman, and Bowman (1998) discuss the loss of Carbon (C) and 
Nitrogen (N) in the Central Great Plains. They began by testing land on seventeen 
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experiment stations with dryland cropping histories extending back from 40-60 years. 
They found that, compared to land that had been in its natural state for that period, C and 
N had decreased by 42 percent and 36 percent, respectively. They theorized that this was 
caused by exposure to erosion, reduced additions from organic matter, and enhanced soil 
organic matter (SOM) decomposition through depth mixing, temperature change, and 
aeration. One major question they hoped to address was the question of rate of decrease; 
do the levels of C and N decrease rapidly and stay low? Their estimates of achieving 
steady state ranged from 30-90 years.  
 In order to answer these questions, the authors selected two plots in Wisconsin 
(controlled for water erosion through selection of a level site), and applied treatments to 
each plot. One plot was a sandy loam soil, and the other was a clay loam soil. The 
treatments applied consisted of: native left in native, native land converted to cropping, 
cropped land left in cropping, and cropped land converted to native.  
While fields left in their original states functioned as controls, with C and N 
remaining essentially unchanged, the results on the converted parcels were significantly 
different. There was a rapid decline in the levels of C and N on the native land converted 
to cropping, with the levels dropping in just 6 years, to the level of the cropped land that 
had been in production for 60+ years. This indicates that there is a rapid decrease in soil 
nutrients, and that they hit a steady state early after conversion.  There was also a drastic 
change in soil nutrients on land that was converted from cropping to native state. After 
just 6 years in a managed CRP state, the land had reached levels of C and N greater than 
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that of land that had never been put in production in the first place. There was a small 
disparity between the types of soil, with sandy loam doing better than clay loam, but the 
results were the same overall.  
Burke, Lauenroth, and Coffin (1995) studied organic matter to determine if, 
“…abandoned fields recover total soil organic matter, active soil matter, and N 
availability after 53 years [of non-cropping, following decades of cropping]” (Burke et 
al., 1995). They theorized that tillage/cropping decreases SOM because these practices 
increase output of SOM and also decrease residual plant replenishment.  
The authors used 12 sites in the Pawnee National Grasslands in northeast 
Colorado, that they termed ‘abandoned’ fields. These fields had been cropped until 1942 
and left idle until the study period in 1995. At five of their sites there was nearby 
cropland they used as controls. Three sites were chosen from the Pawnee National 
Grasslands for immediate C and N testing, with their samples being refrigerated and sent 
to lab. The method of testing was soil core extraction with test depths of 0-5 in. and 5-10 
in. below the surface.  
“Microbial biomass C and N were significantly higher on both native and 
abandoned fields than on cultivated fields. However, there were no significant 
differences between native and abandoned treatments with respect to microbial biomass 
for either microsite or depth.” (Burke et al., 1995) These findings support a large body of 
literature that says that cultivated land typically has 30-40 percent less C and N than 
native/abandoned land. Addressing this issue is important for land managers who are 
 31 
 
considering taking land out of production or enrolling in the Conservation Reserve 
Program.  
A key issue to address is the attempt to retain as much of the benefits gained 
from the CRP program as possible after the rejection of a parcels bid, or the choice to 
remove that parcel from the program. A key benefit to try to maintain is the soil retained 
from prevented erosion. Panuska, Good, and Wolkowski address this issue in, 
“Converting CRP Land to Corn: Minimizing Soil Loss.” They use a SNAP (Soil 
Nutrient Application Planner)-Plus nutrient management software to evaluate the 
sediment loss from different farming methods. This program incorporates NRCS’s 
Revised Universal Soil Loss Equation (RUSLE2), and their data was taken from 
multiple fields with two differing slope ranges; 6-12 percent and 12-20 percent. Their 
results are found in Table 2.4, with the gray bars representing averages and the black 
lines representing actual observances.  
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 The authors found that soil erodability and slope both significantly impact soil 
loss, and they compared the results to ‘tolerable’ soil loss, which is equal to the rate of 
soil formation. If the amount of soil loss is greater than the tolerable amount, there will 
be long term damage to the soil. Their suggestions following these comparisons are that, 
to prevent degradation, erodible, sloped land should be enrolled in CRP, and when 
planting corn, no-till or minimal-till is highly recommended, as is rotation, and the use of 
no-till cover crops for corn-silage are beneficial to the soil. It should be noted that corn is 
not the most common crop replaced by CRP in the Great Plains, which holds the highest 
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enrollment of CRP, but in the Southwest Corn Belt it is very common, and these results 
are likely transferrable to land that is commonly used to grow wheat, cotton, or sorghum.  
Hunting and Wildlife on the CRP 
  A key difference in this study’s decision aid will be the inclusion of hunting 
benefits to landowners. Wildlife considerations account for a large portion of the EBI, 
and should also be considered when making choices on whether or not to retain land in 
the CRP or to convert back to cropland.  
 In, “Estimating the Response of Ring-Necked Pheasants (Phasianus Colchicus) 
to the CRP,” Nielson et al. attempt to determine whether or not Ring-Necked Pheasants 
(Pheasants) will be impacted by a change in the amount of CRP acreage enrolled in a 
given area. They point out that, due to their adaptability to differing habitats, pheasants 
should benefit from most types of CRP cover, and that in past literature an increase in 
CRP acreage typically increased the number of pheasants.  
 The study uses the Breeding Bird Survey (BBS) and data from the Farm Service 
Agency (FSA) to estimate whether or not CRP acreage will have an impact on pheasant 
population. The BBS methodology is simple; a driver and a spotter drive through 
different locales and stop for 3 minutes at pre-designated locations to count the number 
of birds seen or heard. This study took in to account all 4615 bird counts conducted 
within a year, and used the sum of pheasants along a route as an index of abundance. 
The study developed a set of ‘buffer’ zones. These zones had radiuses of 400 meters, 
700 meters, and 1000 meters, and the percentages of CRP and other land types in each 
 34 
 
buffer were used as predictor variables. These buffers were established based on the 
daily range of a pheasant’s movement. The study was conducted in two regions in the 
northwestern United States.  
 The final results find a positive relationship between pheasant numbers and 
routes with increased CRP acreage. An increase in CRP acreage by 4 percent correlated 
to an approximate 22 percent increase in the pheasant count, and as these results were 
similar across such a large range, the authors deem the information to be widely 
applicable and reliable.  
 With wildlife being a potential source of income during and post-CRP, 
Geaumont, Vlaminck, Schauer, and Sedivec (2007) studied the number of pheasant on 
land that was recently removed from the CRP. The authors posit that managing post-
CRP land for agriculture and environmental outputs can be beneficial environmentally 
and economically.  
 The authors selected two study sites that were 640 acres each that had, until 
recently, been CRP land. The plots were each split and given different treatments that 
included grazing by 33-45 cows, haying, idling, and cropping. The pheasant nests were 
found by ‘dragging’, or hooking a chain up between two vehicles and driving across a 
field every two weeks. When a bird ‘flushed’ they searched for the nest near that point 
and made a count.  
 The authors found that substantially more pheasant nested in the seasonal grazing 
plots and idled land, to the point that the cropping and haying results were 
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inconsequential. The authors believe this proves the need for maintaining areas of 
permanent cover, if pheasant production is a desired outcome. They also theorized that 
no more than 50 percent ‘disappearance’ of grazing lands would be sufficient for 
pheasant nesting.  
 The ring-necked pheasant is not the only species that is impacted by the CRP. 
The Prairie Pothole Region (PPR), or as it is sometimes called, “The Duck Factory,” is a 
region in the northern United States in which five of the most common species of ducks 
nest. The PPR was, at one point, covered in glacial formations that, as they receded, left 
huge ‘potholes’ that later filled with water and became millions of ponds that now make 
a prime nesting area for duck recruitment.  
 Reynolds, Shaffer, Renner, Newton, and Batt (2001) describe the CRP programs 
long term effects on the duck population in the critical area of the PPR. Between 1992 
and 1995, the authors evaluated the success of duck nesting in fields composed of 
various types of CRP cover. The genesis of this study was the hope that due to increased 
conservation land through the CRP, the number of ducks would be increasing from their 
dismal levels, which were at their lowest levels in 1992 since 1955, when the counting of 
waterfowl species began.  The evaluation of nesting success is important, as increased 
nesting success is directly correlated with increased duck numbers. The objective of the 
study was to estimate the average Daily Survival Rates (DSR) in CRP cover and 
compare that with pre-CRP numbers, and to compare duck recruitment in CRP with a 
predictive model evaluating the situation if the land had never been converted to CRP.  
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 The authors monitored 335 plots in the PPR, which were classified by cover type, 
and conducted annual surveys of those plots for breeding pairs. They then used 
regression-ratio analysis to estimate the number of breeding pairs. One hundred thirty-
eight of these plots included over 16.2 hectares of CRP land, which was a pre-
established measure for evaluation. These plots were the sites of nest counting.  
 Nest success and recruitment in CRP were 46 percent and 30 percent higher, 
respectively, than land without a presence of CRP. The authors noted that due to the 
presence of such a high quantity of CRP in the region, some of which were near control 
i.e. cropped fields, those controls may have been impacted. However, this does mean 
that the results, if anything, would increase. The authors found that CRP nest rates were 
as good as Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) nesting rates, and both were substantially 
better than predicted. The authors estimate this increase in nesting success and 
recruitment adds 2.7 million ducks per year to the population. 
 The authors theorize that CRP may increase the success and recruitment of ducks 
for several reasons. The first is that an increase in grass provides increased cover for 
nesting and reduces predator contact with nests, and that the increased availability of 
other prey animals such as other birds, voles, and mice, which increase with the presence 
of CRP acreage, may decrease the need for predation by foxes on duck nests.  
Nesting ducks are sometimes found in groupings or ‘hot spots’ and that several 
of these were found in CRP land. This could mean that ducks do prefer the cover of CRP 
managed land to even natural state land. While this is good during the presence of a 
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large amount of CRP, it does provide a potential explanation for the drastic drop in 
population after the initiation of the Soil Bank program. The authors hypothesize that, if 
ducks concentrate in CRP, and there is little CRP acreage, that there will be a over-
nesting in CRP fields, which not only means adults may have to travel further for forage, 
leaving the nest unattended, but that predators have easier access to a large amount of 
nests at one time, making population decline intensify due to intensified nest failure. 
These explanations show that, if increased duck population is a goal of a landowner or a 
regional economy, enrollment in the CRP is a very viable option.  
 Once again addressing the possibility of wildlife management for post-CRP land, 
however this time with ducks, Geaumont, Sebesta, Sedivec, and Schauer (2007) tested 
multiple plots for duck populations. They theorized that, much like the case of the ring-
necked pheasant, land exiting the CRP could be managed for agriculture and 
environmental outputs in such a way that would provide profit for the producer both 
environmentally and economically. The study was conducted in the PPR region.  
 The methods were the same as the authors’ previous pheasant study. Two 640 
acre sights were chosen, each having recently exited the CRP. The plots were split into 
different practices including grazing by 33-45 cows, haying, idling, and cropping. The 
duck nests were found by ‘dragging’ for birds, and searching for the nests when a bird 
had ‘flushed’. The authors do note that, due to the increased mobility of ducks, these 
results may be slightly less reliable than those of the pheasant study.  
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 The authors found notable nesting concentrations by mallards, gadwalls, pintails, 
and teal, four of the five major species that nest in the PPR. The authors found that, 
while pheasant had limited nesting in cropped and hayed land, ducks avoided these areas 
entirely. They found zero nesting sites for any species in these plots. The authors found 
that their nesting rates were higher than any found in any other literature. The authors 
theorize that this was likely due to the presence of cattle, which discouraged the presence 
of any of the small predators that typically prey on ducks and duck nests. This, once 
again, supports the hypothesis that management in a CRP cover can realize rents from 
both agriculture outputs and hunting/environmental outputs.  
 In an attempt to prove that hunting on CRP land is a viable economic option, 
Williams and Mjelde (1994) authored a study entitled, “Conducting a Financial Analysis 
of Quail Huting within the CRP”, which establishes several practices and compares them 
to land idled in the CRP.  
 Under the study, the authors established three scenarios under which hunting 
could be compared to no hunting. Scenario One included amenities to guests such as 
accommodations and meals, along with pen raised birds. Scenario Two provides 
amenities to guests, but develops a wild population on CRP land. Scenario Three is a 
typical hunting lease on CRP land with an established wild population. Under their study 
they took budget items from the Texas regional average obtained from Texas AgriLife 
Extension Service, Texas Parks and Wildlife, the National Rifle Association, local 
appraisal districts, and the Texas Department of Agriculture. The authors assumed that 
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half of the establishment costs of the enterprise were shared under government funding, 
that there was no debt prior to the beginning of the enterprise, and that there was no 
borrowing.  
 The study results, simplified to fit this study of CRP are presented in table 2.5.  
. 
 As you can see from the results, the best scenario, in terms of Net Present Value 
(NPV) is Scenario 1, netting over $40,000 more over the 10 year life of the analysis than 
the next-best scenario, Scenario 3. The authors note that economies of scale could 
change these results, and that assumed management practices within each scenario could 
be adjusted. While this study is slightly dated, (1994) it does prove the need for 
evaluating hunting options in conjunction with operating CRP land.   
 Finally, in, “Wildlife Considerations in the Management of CRP Lands,” an 
appendix to a report published by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the authors 
point out that, if habitat improvement is the goal, it should be noted that the same kind of 
CRP cover does not always work for all game species.  
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 Under considerations for big game, the document specifically addresses the 
needs of mule deer, white tail deer, and pronghorn antelope, the major large species that 
are found on CRP land. The report states that these species will benefit from planned 
grazing and burning, as this helps with cover establishment and health. This cover 
provides ideal fawning conditions and escape cover from coyotes, the biggest threat to 
fawn populations. However, while the establishment of low brush is good for both deer 
species, it does not provide benefits for pronghorn, which are ideally suited to massive 
open range. The report does note that if CRP is established near cropping practices, the 
establishment of legumes or forbs will decrease the damage done to those cropped areas 
by these big game animals.  
 When planning for game birds, the considerations are as widely varied as the 
birds themselves. The specific birds identified by the report as inhabiting CRP are quail, 
pheasant, prairie chicken, and turkey. In planning for any of these birds, a planned 
burning or grazing will increase forb production which will increase insect production 
providing two types of food for these birds. It is also considered beneficial to hay, as 
long as it is after July 15, the end of the primary nesting season for most upland birds, 
and strategic places, like fencerows, are left alone.  
 When specifically targeting pheasant, it is advised to plant smaller tracts, 
specifically fencerows in brush, as this can provide ideal habitat for the birds. The report 
mentions a common practice of the Texas Panhandle called cornering, which simple 
 41 
 
means leaving the corners of the circle irrigation pivots idle. These corners provide ideal 
habitat for pheasant, and are frequented by hunters.  
 When planning for quail, there are two species to consider. Both operate in small 
tracts of CRP, but need separate cover types. Woody canopy cover and brush 
establishment along fencerows will lead to more Northern Bobwhites, while less woody 
cover will lead to Scaled Quail.  
 When planning for turkey or prairie chickens on CRP land, the situation becomes 
more complex. The report says that these birds must have increased tracts of land 
available in CRP, as they have a much larger range than the previously mentioned birds, 
and are more mobile on a daily basis. They must also have a more diverse habitat than 
quail or pheasant as their roosting habitats, escape cover, nesting, and feeding cover are 
not all the same.  
 When planning for waterfowl, such as ducks, geese, and cranes, it is 
recommended that a 3:1 ratio of CRP upland buffers to playa basins is maintained. The 
Texas Panhandle, a region of the Southern Great Plains, is a major wintering area for 
ducks, geese, and Sandhill Cranes, as well as the Bald Eagle, and the retention of 
prescribed buffers with planned haying and grazing, along with legume inter-seeding is 
highly recommended.  
 This review of literature proves a few major points. The choice of whether or not 
a producer should leave their land in the CRP can have major financial decisions. There 
are a few major considerations to take when looking at that choice.  
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 The first is to make sure the producer understands the function of the CRP and 
whether or not they, and their land, are eligible. This is a simple matter of informing the 
producer of their options and making sure they understand where their official 
documentation can be found and returned to, as well as who they can contact about the 
program. 
 The second, more complex, area of this decision is incorporating producers EBIs 
and their bids. It is important to understand the balancing act of these two factors and 
how they are the key factors influencing a parcels probability of acceptance in the CRP.  
 The final important piece of the puzzle is ensuring the producer understands the 
options available. If they choose to stay, or enter, the CRP which practice will be the 
best choice for them financially and in terms of the health of their land? This must 
incorporate not only their budgets, but the variability of the fertility of their land. If they 
choose to exit the CRP, or their bid is not accepted, the producer needs to understand 
their options. These include, but are not limited to, commodity production, livestock 
production, continued conservation practices with no management, and continued 
conservation with wildlife in mind, either for hunting or not. 
 This study, and resulting thesis, develops a decision aid that accounts for all of 
these important components of the enrollment choice. By developing a model that 
accounts for eligibility, bidding, the EBI, and discounted net incomes from different 
options, a decision aid can help a producer make an informed decision that will impact 
their financial future, as well as the future of their land.    
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Risk  
 Accurate economic modeling requires incorporating an element of risk. Risk is 
the part of a business model that cannot be controlled by the decision maker, also called 
the error term. Risk is particularly relevant to agriculture, which faces biological risk, 
price risk, weather risk, and risk associated with government policies. Ignoring risk in 
economic modeling can yield a point estimate, also called a deterministic estimate, 
however this method could under or overstate the risk of a particular investment.  
 Including stochastic values in an economic model incorporates an element of risk 
(Richardson, 2014). A stochastic model assumes two things that are essential to its 
operation. The first is that future risk is the same as historic risk, and the second is that 
while a variable may be unknown, its probability distribution is known. Stochastic 
models, and particularly Monte Carlo sampling, which is used in the Conservation 
Reserve Program Choice model, simulate risky variables a large number of times. This 
constructs a probability distribution of Key Output Variables (KOV) (Richardson, 2014) 
which can be used by a decision maker in evaluating the returns of a future investment. 
Richardson and Mapp (1976) use Net Present Value (NPV) as their key output variable, 
and indicate that this is an acceptable measure when evaluating investment decisions in 
small businesses, i.e. agriculture production.  
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 As discussed previously, Monte Carlo simulation constructs probability 
distributions. There are two types of probability distributions, parametric and non-
parametric (Richardson, 2014). A parametric distribution has known parameters, while a 
non-parametric distribution does not. The non-parametric distribution is used in cases 
when there are too few observations to find the required parameters for a parametric 
distribution. These parameters include mean and standard deviation, for a normal 
distribution, and minimum and maximum values for a uniform distribution (Richardson, 
2014). When these values are not known, an empirical distribution can be constructed 
using the sorted values of the available data and the probabilities of each of those values. 
 Richardson and Mapp (1976) lay out the steps for developing a simulation model 
connected to an investment decision. “The first step in developing a stochastic model for 
investment analysis is identification of critical variables…” (Richardson & Mapp, 1976). 
The next step is to develop probability distributions for those key variables thought to be 
stochastic. Next, links must be formed between stochastic variables, and fixed, or known 
variables that will influence the eventual outcome of the investment. Finally, these 
variables must be connected to accounting relationships associated with the proposed 
investment, and linked to the Key Output Variables (KOVs) (Richardson & Mapp 1976).  
 While simulation yields a more accurate prediction of an investments return by 
including risk, it is ultimately up to the decision maker, not the model, to act on that 
investment. When facing this choice, a decision maker’s attitude towards risk becomes 
important. Nicholson and Snyder (2012) describe decision makers as one of three risk 
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types; risk-loving, risk-neutral, or risk-averse, under the assumption that all three types 
are attempting to maximize utility.   
Methods of Ranking Risky Alternatives 
  After the construction of a simulation model that includes risk, the decision 
maker must choose their option. Several simulation outputs constructed by Simetar, the 
software used in this research, can assist producers in these decisions.  
 The first method of evaluating multiple options is the cumulative distribution 
function (CDF). A CDF displays all possible outcomes for each option within the 
simulation, with the X axis representing an individual KOV’s value associated with the 
Y axis’ probability, which ranges from 0-1. This method’s major limitation is that the 
CDFs for each option often cross (Richardson, 2014). Under ideal circumstances, the 
decision maker would take the investment option whose CDF falls the furthest to the 
right, however, things become more complicated when the CDFs of two options cross, 
and it is often the case that more than two cross at different points.  
 Incorporating a decision maker’s utility function in ranking scenarios can impose 
a tighter restriction on risk aversion. This can be done using stochastic dominance with 
respect to a function (SDRF). A decision maker’s utility is bounded by a lower risk 
aversion coefficient and an upper risk aversion coefficient (LRAC and URAC 
respectively) (Richardson, 2014). Each alternative is calculated at both the LRAC and 
URAC, and if the same choice is preferred at both levels, then the preferred alternative is 
the ‘efficient set’.  
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 In 2004, Hardaker et al. developed a second method of ranking alternatives 
incorporating risk called stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF). Like 
SDRF, SERF ranks risky alternatives over a specified range of risk preferences, in terms 
of certainty equivalences. Hardaker et al. According to Richardson (2014), SERF has the 
advantage of comparing multiple scenarios while SDRF can only compare pairwise 
combinations. SERF has two possible outcomes. When the certainty equivalent of an 
option is greater than the certainty equivalent of another option, that option with the 
greater certainty equivalent is preferred. The second option is that, when two options 
have an equal certainty equivalent, the decision maker will be indifferent between the 
two.  
A final useful method of ranking risky alternatives is a stoplight chart ranking. 
This visual method of ranking evaluates probabilities of realizing favorable outcomes 
and displays them on a stacked bar chart. Outcomes that are deemed favorable are 
colored green, outcomes that are deemed unfavorable are colored red, and outcomes 
falling between the two thresholds, or cautionary results, are colored yellow. An 
advantage of the stoplight ranking method is that it allows the decision maker to set their 
own threshold of ‘favorable’ and ‘unfavorable’, by selecting a lower cut-off value and an 
upper cut-off value. The idea of ranking scenarios based on probabilities was described 
by Richardson and Mapp (1976), and the stoplight method of presentation was presented 
by Richardson (2014).  
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Environmental Benefits Index Estimate 
 One of the goals of this study was to develop a fields ‘likelihood of acceptance’ 
in to CRP. Upon conducting an exhaustive literature review, it was determined that this 
is not technically possible. Accepting and Rejecting Signup 45 Offers (2013) states that, 
“Offers with an EBI score of 209 or greater were determined basically acceptable.” This 
is a national standard set after all submitted bids were compared. If a particular parcel’s 
EBI was higher than 209, it was accepted, and if that particular parcel’s EBI was lower 
than 209, it was not. While this does set a previous standard, it also makes it impossible 
to develop a probability of acceptance, as the probability is conditional upon all other 
bids received. This information cannot be known until after the General Signup period 
has expired in February 2016.  
 While this procedure means that we cannot develop a probability of acceptance, 
it did allow for the construction of a slightly different tool. The Agricultural Act of 2014 
only limits the amount of acres in the CRP, not the amount of money spent. This means 
that as long as a parcel’s EBI is above the national threshold, it will be accepted, subject 
to the acreage constraint even if there are a high number of acceptable applications that 
year. As a basis of comparison, the EBI Estimator (to be discussed further in this 
section) value can be compared to the last three general signup EBI thresholds. Signup 
45, 43, and 41 had EBIs thresholds of 209, 209, and 221, respectively. A bar chart on the 
‘Home Page’ of the decision aid compares a parcel’s estimated EBI to the past general 
signup thresholds.  
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 A particular field’s non-cost EBI is made known to them prior to bid selection. 
As described above, this EBI is developed through scientific analysis conducted by the 
Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS). The NRCS conducts scores a parcel’s 
soil erosion impacts, wildlife practice establishment impacts, water quality impacts, air 
quality impacts, and enduring benefit impacts (FSA Handbook; Agricultural Resource 
Conservation Program, 2008). A decision maker must take their EBI in to account when 
making an accurate bid to increase their probability of acceptance, and maximize their 
profits from CRP participation. The EBI estimator was designed in order for a producer 
to have a method of constructing their approximate EBI. Information for this tool was 
taken from the Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits 
Index (EBI) Fact Sheet (FSA, 2013). Each point allocation for a specific practice or 
qualification is included in Appendix A.  
 Section A of the EBI Estimator is the Wildlife Score. The Wildlife Score is 
composed of three parts, the wildlife habitat cover benefits score, the wildlife 
enhancement score, and the wildlife priority zone score. The wildlife habitat cover 
benefits score allows a producer to enter a number of acres in to a wildlife practice, 
which generates a weighted average of their cover establishment plan. Point value 
assignments for each cover practice can be found in Table A.1 in Appendix A.  
The wildlife enhancement section allows a producer to qualify for 20 points, 5 
points, or 0 points. To qualify for 20 points the producer must convert at least 51 percent 
of a primarily monoculture stand to a mixture of native species that provides wildlife 
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benefits, or establish a pollinator habitat. To qualify for 5 points, the producer must 
choose a practice that makes their field an annual or permanent food plot that remains in 
the same location for the duration of the contract. To qualify for 0 points, the producer 
will not have chosen any of the above options. A table of these choices and their 
specifics can be found in Table A.2 in Appendix A. These points are not weighted, but 
added directly to the weighted average of wildlife habitat cover benefits. The EBI 
Estimator allows a producer to select one of the above options, indicating their 
participation, or lack thereof, in a wildlife enhancement practice.  
Wildlife priority zone points are based on the lands qualification as a Wildlife 
Priority Zone. According to the FSA EBI Fact Sheet, “FSA consulted with farm, 
commodity, wildlife and environmental groups to develop high-priority wildlife areas 
that would benefit from being enrolled in CRP. For land located within this defined 
geographic area, points are awarded for planting cover mixes to benefit wildlife 
species.” If a particular field qualifies as a wildlife priority zone, the 30 points are added 
to the EBI. This is only the case if the weighted average of the wildlife habitat cover 
benefits score is greater than 40 points. The county FSA office in conjunction with the 
area NRCS office has information on areas designated as wildlife priority areas. The EBI 
Estimator allows a producer to indicate whether or not their parcel qualifies as a wildlife 
priority zone or not, and allocates either 0 or 30 points based on their choice.  
Section B. of the EBI Estimator tool is the Water Quality Benefits section. This 
score is comprised of a composite score of the parcel’s location, groundwater quality 
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score, and surface water quality score. Each of these factors requires contact with local 
USDA service centers in order to determine a parcel’s eligibility and score. The first 
component, location, is worth either 0 or 30 points. At least 51 percent of the acreage 
offered must be in an approved water quality zone to receive 30 points, otherwise the 
point allocation is 0 (FSA EBI Fact Sheet, 2013). The EBI Estimator allows a producer 
to indicate whether or not their parcel qualifies as a water priority zone or not, and 
allocates either 0 or 30 points based on their choice. 
The second component of the water quality benefits section is groundwater 
quality, which is worth 0 to 25 points. Point scores are based on the weighted average 
leach index for soils and the population that utilizes that groundwater for drinking (FSA 
EBI Fact Sheet, 2013). The EBI Estimator allows a producer to assume average 
groundwater quality, or enter their FSA assigned score. The final component of the 
water quality benefits score is the surface water quality score which is worth 0 to 45 
points, and is determined by potential water erosion in the watershed the field is located 
in. The EBI Estimator allows a producer to assume average surface water quality, or 
enter their FSA assigned score.  
 Section C. of the EBI Estimator is the erosion factor score. This is based on an 
Erosion Index of wind and water erosion. The erosion factor is worth up to 100 points. 
The score is based the weighted average of the higher value of either the wind or water 
erosion index. These values can be found in Table A.3 in appendix A. Information on a 
parcel’s erosion can be found using the Web Soil Survey 
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(http://websoilsurvey.nrcs.usda.gov/app/WebSoilSurvey.aspx), or by contacting local 
FSA offices.  The EBI Estimator allows a producer to either assume the minimum 
qualifying erodibility or choose the FSA assigned score.  
 Section D. of the EBI Estimator is the Enduring Benefits factor. This is an 
evaluation of certain wildlife cover practices that will have benefits beyond the CRP 
contract. These values are determined by taking the weighted average of participation in 
certain cover practices, which can be found in Table A.4 in Appendix A. The EBI 
Estimator allows a producer to choose any combination of practices they are enrolled in, 
and allocates the weighted average points for these practices.  
 The final component of the environmental portion of the Environmental Benefits 
Index (EEBI) is the Air Quality benefits score, which is worth 3 to 45 points and is 
composed of a wind erosion impacts score, a wind erosion soils list score, and a carbon 
sequestration score. The wind erosion impacts score is determined by FSA and the point 
value is 0 to 25. The FSA determines wind erosion impacts by taking in to account 
climatic factors such as wind speed, wind direction and duration, and soil erodibility. 
The EBI Estimator allows a producer to assume the average wind erosion impact, or to 
choose the FSA assigned wind erosion impact value.  
 The second component of the air quality benefits is the wind erosion soils list 
points. This section is worth 0 or 5 points, based on if a field’s soil is on the ‘list’ or not. 
Soils that qualify are susceptible to wind and contribute to nonattainment of air quality 
standards. If at least 51 percent of the offered acres are made up of these soils, the offer 
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is given 5 points (FSA EBI Fact Sheet, 2013). The EBI Estimator allows a producer to 
indicate whether or not their parcel qualifies for these points, and if so, adds them to the 
score.  
 The third portion of the air quality benefits score is the Air Quality Zone score. If 
at least 51 percent of enrolled land qualifies as an air quality zone, the offer is given an 
additional 5 points. If a field’s calculated wind erosion index is greater than or equal to 
three, it qualifies as an air quality zone. The EBI Estimator allows a producer to choose 
whether their land qualifies as an air quality zone or not, and allocates either 0 or 5 
points based on their choice.  
 The final portion of the air quality benefits score is carbon sequestration. This is 
worth 3 to 10 points, and is based on a practice’s accrued benefits from sequestering 
greenhouse gases. The point value is a weighted average of these benefits from practices 
found in Table A.5 in Appendix A. The EBI Estimator allows a producer to select all 
practices that their land will be enrolled in, and allocates points based on the formula 
described above.  
 A separate portion of the EBI is the cost factor. According to the FSA EBI Fact 
Sheet from the 45
th
 sign up (2013), the cost factor optimizes the environmental benefits 
per dollar of CRP payments. These points are allocated in two categories. The first is 
called Cost. This point value is not determined until after all offers are entered, and is 
subject to the per acre rental rate nationwide. Offers with lower per acre rental rates will 
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receive more of these points, and therefore have a higher chance of being accepted in to 
the program.  
 A second, more transparent, portion of this cost factor is the points allocated for 
an offer being less than the maximum payment rate. This portion is worth 0 to 25 points. 
The maximum payment rate for an offer is set by FSA, and is tailored to each field. 
Offers are allocated these points based on their offer’s value as a percentage of the 
maximum rental rate. Table A.6 in Appendix A. shows the point value associated with 
each percentage less than the maximum offer. The EBI estimator uses a stochastic 
prediction of county payment rate, based on historic county averages, to determine the 
percentage below the maximum a bid is. The stochastic maximum payment rate was 
developed using data from FSAs CRP enrollment and rental payments by county 
records. As one county’s rental rate is not conditional upon another county’s, each 
county’s stochastic rate was estimated as an individual empirical value. The actual 
producer bid is taken from the home page, where the producer can change their bid to 
whatever level they choose.  
 After sections A-F are completed, the points from each section are aggregated to 
compose the overall EBI. This EBI can then be compared to the general sign-up 45, 43, 
and 41 thresholds, and the counties previous average EBI, if that data is available.  
Enrollment Decision 
 The purpose of this study is to develop a decision aid that will assist producers in 
choosing the best use of their land.  Five practices were selected for evaluation. These 
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include CRP, cropping (six different options common to Texas were included), cow-calf 
production, hunting, and a hunting/CRP combination use. A difference in this aid 
compared to previous research is that it allows a producer to begin the analysis from a 
position of previous CRP enrollment, or not enrolled. This means that a producer that is 
already enrolled or that is not enrolled has the same five options, and penalties and 
conversion costs are included in the analysis. According to Sullivan et al. (2004), 
producers will likely choose the land-use option that has the highest net returns. 
However, they do point out that non-quantifiable aspects of the decision, such as time 
commitment to producing on previous CRP land, attitude of producers, and age can have 
an impact on the final decision.  
 As stated previously, agricultural production deals with inherent risk related to 
biological variability, weather, policy, and prices. In order to accurately model a 
producer’s choices, risk was incorporated through stochastic variables for yields and 
prices, as well as other select components that varied by practice. Production costs are 
taken from sample AgriLife Extension budgets per each enterprise, however they are 
fully adjustable based on the producer’s specific situation. This model can be tailored to 
any individual producer with enough production information to fill out the Home Page 
of the model. A test is conducted on a farm in Dallam County, Texas, that does not have 
any previously enrolled CRP land, and stochastic estimates for each of the five listed 
practices are used to determine the best decision for a producer. The key output variables 
(KOVs) that are examined and compared are the net present value (NPV) and the present 
value of ending net worth (PVENW) for each of the five listed options. Each of the listed 
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comparison methods are taken in to consideration, and evaluated for each of the five 
options.   
CRP Enrollment 
 The first option evaluated is the decision to enroll, or re-enroll land in CRP. 
Before considering returns to investment, a producer must ensure that they are eligible to 
participate in the program. For land to be eligible, it must meet the ‘previously cropped’ 
provision, which means it must have been cropped in four of the six years preceding 
enrollment in CRP. A producer must have owned or operated the land for, at minimum, 
twelve months prior to the CRP sign-up. Exceptions include land acquired due to 
previous owner’s death, change in ownership due to foreclosure, or land purchased by 
the new owner without the sole intent of enrolling in CRP (FSA, 2014). These 
provisions are in place in an attempt to keep any entity from purchasing large tracts of 
land for the sole purpose of treating CRP payments as an investment (Stubbs, 2014). The 
land cannot be currently enrolled in a CRP contract, which means it can be expiring, or 
not have been enrolled in the first place.  
 The decision aid uses the producer’s bid to construct the stream of net returns 
composed of CRP payments. Schuchard (2011) uses a multivariate empirical distribution 
to determine the stream of revenues for CRP, however that study was conducted at the 
county level, making it impossible to evaluate at an individual level. As this study is 
aimed at an individual producer, and not a county level, it is appropriate to use a 
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producer’s chosen bid as the factor when weighing the CRP option. These returns are 
held constant over the life of the contract, and therefore held constant in the aid.   
 If land is not currently enrolled in CRP, the costs to convert it are calculated by 
the decision aid. Conversion budgets for Texas were sought, but not found, so a budget 
developed by Iowa State Extension was adjusted to fit the typical Texas case. The 
budget was annualized, as some costs only occur every few years, and taken to a per acre 
basis. Table 3.1 shows the adjusted budget used under the assumption that the producer 
has previously had the land enrolled in CRP, i.e., there are no conversion costs.   
 
 The typical cost-share of establishing CRP is 50 percent. This means that 
whatever the sum of the cost from converting land to CRP equals, the government will 
assume half. Cost-share is taken in to account by the CRP conversion budget, and is 
based upon an individual producers costs.  
 A departure from previous literature in this study is the inclusion of hunting 
returns on land enrolled in CRP. The decision aid allows producers to choose a daily 
lease fee per person and to estimate a minimum, middle, and maximum number of 
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hunters that will participate in hunting on the CRP land. The daily lease fee is multiplied 
by a GRKS distribution of the minimum, middle, and maximum estimated number of 
hunters, and this figure is divided by the number of acres, and added on to the CRP bid 
per acre to determine total returns from CRP enrollment.  
 The only decrease in CRP payments comes from penalties accrued from activity 
that is described under the Agricultural Act of 2014. These penalties come from early 
exit, which is not an issue to someone enrolling in CRP, or grazing. The decision aid 
calculates penalties based upon the users input. If prescribed rotational grazing (limited 
to two years) is to be undertaken on CRP land, the producer has the option to indicate 
that on the home page. The decision aid’s penalty calculator, shown in Table 3.2, shows 
a stream of penalties over the first five years of the CRP contract. The case shown is of 
land that was not previously enrolled, that is to be enrolled, and will have rotational 
grazing conducted every two years, beginning in 2015. The penalty is calculated on a per 
acre basis, and is equal to 25 percent of the per acre payment.  
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Cropping 
 The second option evaluated by the aid is for a producer to either continue 
cropping land, or if they are enrolled in the CRP, exit and return land to cropping. Six 
options were given to the producer through the aid. These options include production of 
corn, cotton, hay, sorghum, and wheat. For each option the producer is able to choose 
irrigated or dryland production, although the majority of the literature indicates that CRP 
land is primarily interchanged with dryland production and not irrigated. If the user 
chooses the “Hay” option, the only choice they have is irrigated. This is due to the fact 
that National Agricultural Statistic Service (NASS) data is only available for irrigated 
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hay in the state of Texas. The entire process described in this section is based on the 
user’s input regarding their cropping history and future cropping choice.  
 Historical yields are used when building a stochastic estimate of future yields.  
The decision aid allows a producer to either enter their own historical yields, or use 
historical yields taken from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS) Quick 
Stats 2.0 tool. Where available, the NASS data is county specific, and where county-
specific data was not available, the Texas state average was used. If NASS had no record 
at the state or county level, the producer must enter an estimated average yield, even if 
cropping was not undertaken, in order for the model to function correctly. Any time the 
producer enters a yield, the model uses that yield over NASS data. Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) baseline prices are used as the predicted 
price information. The historic price and future price predictions were taken from the 
U.S. Baseline Briefing (Westhoff et. al, 2015). The producer has the option of entering a 
local price basis on the home page, if there is one present. This allows the model to 
construct a more accurate prediction based on the user’s geographic basis.  
 The historic price and yield data were used to develop a deterministic estimate of 
price and yield. A multivariate empirical distribution was then used to develop a 
stochastic price estimate based the user’s crop decision. Depending on the user’s input, a 
price basis is incorporated in to the stochastic estimate of prices. These localized prices 
are then multiplied by the stochastic yields to generate market receipts per acre. An 
insurance worksheet uses input from the home page to calculate an insured yield by 
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multiplying the user determined APH yield by their chosen insurance coverage 
percentage. This worksheet also accounts for the cost of a premium per acre, which is 
also taken from user input. The guaranteed price is taken from the Agricultural Act of 
2014’s Title I commodity prices. If the worksheet calculates a yield loss, it will calculate 
an insurance indemnity by multiplying the lost yield of the chosen crop by the price 
guaranteed by the Agricultural Act of 2014.  
 The insurance worksheet has a separate case for cotton, as it is no longer 
considered a covered commodity in Title I of the Agricultural Act of 2014. The Stacked 
Income Protection Plan (STAX) payments are generated using historic county yield 
taken from NASS. The expected county income is calculated by multiplying the 
expected county yield and FAPRI projected price. Payments from STAX are triggered if 
the actual county income, calculated by multiplying the actual yield by actual price, is 
below 90 percent of the expected county income. If an indemnity is due from the cotton 
STAX program, or the standard insurance worksheet, it is added to the market receipts 
per acre to calculate total returns per acre.  
 After receipts per acre are calculated, expenses for each enterprise are included. 
Texas A&M AgriLife Extension develops enterprise budgets for each of these crops on 
an annual basis. These budgets were adapted for use in the decision aid to include 
insurance payments, and stochastic yields. Each of the original budgets can be seen in 
Appendix B., tables B1-B12. Lines were moved, added, and eliminated where necessary 
for model functionality. As the decision of whether or not to enroll in CRP is a marginal 
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one, fixed costs are not included in the test case, although a budget is available in the aid 
if a producer would like to include fixed costs, for instance, in the case of a whole-farm 
analysis. FSA maps show that the majority of CRP land in Texas is concentrated in the 
Panhandle and Southern Plains, therefore the budgets that were chosen for use were 
taken from Extension districts one and two where available, and adapted from other 
districts where necessary.  
 These adapted budgets, selected based on the users crop choice, are incorporated 
in to an income statement, statement of cash flow, and balance sheet in order to calculate 
the KOV net present value. Each cost is inflated by the forecasted prices paid index 
prediction, taken from the FAPRI baseline outlook. If the user indicates that there is a 
land rental cost, it is inflated by the consumer price index. The final output is a simulated 
NPV, which is divided by five (the number of years forecasted by the model).  
 This research includes conversion costs when changing enterprises which has not 
been included in past research. Warminksi et al. (2009) presents sample budgets based 
on the necessary activities when converting CRP land to cropland. If the user indicates 
that their land is enrolled in CRP, the decision aid uses a budget adapted from 
Warminksi et al. (2009) to include conversion costs in the financial statements. The 
adapted budget is shown in Table 3.3.  
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 The conversion costs budget is based on the establishment of cropland on land 
that was enrolled in a CRP practice not including trees. According to the June 2015 
Conservation Reserve Program Monthly Summary, this accounts for 2,108,416 acres, or 
99.9 percent of the approximately 2,109,881 acres enrolled in the state of Texas. If a 
producer indicates that their land was not previously enrolled in CRP, the decision aid 
bypasses the establishment budget, and does not include those costs in the final output.  
 Two other budgets are taken in to consideration for calculating the cost of 
converting land to cropping. The first is the penalty calculator described in the previous 
section. If the user indicates that the land is enrolled in CRP but will be exiting prior the 
end of the contract life, the penalty calculator in Table 3.2 uses the producer input from 
the home page indicating the rental payment amount to determine the cost of terminating 
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the CRP contract prior to the expiration of the contract. If the user indicates that the land 
was not previously enrolled, the penalty calculator is bypassed, and that figure is not 
included in the final output.  
 The second budget is a well cost budget adapted from Warminksi et al. (2009). 
And it is included for completeness. If the user indicates that a well is not present, they 
have the option to choose a depth, and pump type. These choices are then used to budget 
the cost of a well, shown in Table 3.4. If the user indicates that there is already a well, or 
that the land does not require the use of a well, this budget is bypassed by the decision 
aid, and the information is not included in the final output.  
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Cow-Calf 
 The decision aid’s third enterprise option is cow-calf production. The user has 
the option to input the number of head owned that will graze, the number of head to be 
purchased, and the fencing option.  
 Stochastic prices were used to generate a probability distribution of profits for 
the cow-calf enterprise. Historic data was taken from NASS on steers and heifers at 500 
lbs. in dollars per hundredweight, and utility cow price in dollars per hundredweight. 
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Again, the standard for future price predictions is FAPRI (Richardson, 2014). Projected 
mean prices were taken from the FAPRI baseline outlook from March 2015.  A 
multivariate empirical distribution was used to calculate the stochastic value of steer 
price and utility cow price, in order to ensure that any correlation between the two was 
not ignored. Heifer and bull prices were taken as a function of steer price. As the NASS 
data is a composite of steer and heifer prices, heifer price was set equal to steer price. 
Bull price was estimated to be 50 percent of steer price. Receipts per head are converted 
to a per acre figure in order to compare the cow-calf option with the other enterprises.  
 A variable weaning rate was used. A GRKS distribution of three possible 
weaning rates was developed. This value is a function of a minimum, middle and 
maximum value, set at 70 percent successful weaning, 80 percent successful weaning, 
and 90 percent successful weaning, respectively. These three rates can be adjusted by the 
producer in the cow-calf enterprise budget. The successful weaning rate corresponds 
directly to the amount of calves available for sale, and therefore profit.  
 A Texas A&M AgriLife Extension budget was used to incorporate expenses in to 
the model. The model was adjusted to include cow purchase, and to incorporate the 
stochastic weaning rate, and user established number of head. The budget was also 
converted to a per acre figure in order to compare the cow-calf option with the other 
enterprises. The original extension budget is shown in Table 3.5.  
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The cow-calf budget also incorporates the costs from converting land from CRP 
to a cow-calf enterprise. Warminksi et al. (2009) presents sample budgets based on the 
necessary activities when converting CRP land to a cow-calf enterprise. If the user 
indicates that their land is enrolled in CRP, the decision aid uses a budget adapted from 
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Warminksi et al. (2009) to include conversion costs in the financial statements. The 
adapted budget is shown in Table 3.6. 
  
 The calculations are based on the user’s chosen fencing option. They can choose 
between 1-strand electric, 2-strand electric, and 5-strand barbed wire. If the user 
indicates that the land is already fenced, the decision aid bypasses the budget and does 
not include this figure in the final output.  
 68 
 
Two other budgets are taken in to consideration for calculating the cost of 
converting land to a cow-calf operation. The first is the penalty calculator described in 
the CRP enrollment section. If the user indicates that the land is enrolled in CRP but will 
be exiting prior the end of the contract life, the penalty calculator in Table 3.2 uses the 
producer input from the home page indicating the rental payment amount to determine 
the cost of terminating the CRP contract prior to the expiration of the contract. If the user 
indicates that the land was not previously enrolled, the penalty calculator is bypassed, 
and that figure is not included in the final output.  
 The second budget is a well cost budget adapted from Warminski et al. (2009). If 
the user indicates that a well is not present, they have the option to choose a depth, and 
pump type. These choices are then used to budget the cost of a well, shown in Table 3.4. 
If the user indicates that there is already a well, or that the land does not require the use 
of a well, this budget is bypassed by the decision aid, and the information is not included 
in the final output.  
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
Test Assumptions 
 The Agricultural and Food Policy Center at Texas A&M University develops 
representative a series of representative farms with producers from around the country. 
The land owned outright by a representative farm in Dallam County, Texas was chosen 
to test the decision aid, as Dallam County is in a region with a high concentration of 
CRP land according to USDA CRP maps. The amount of land owned outright by the 
Dallam county farm totals 450 acres.  
 The CRP decision aid simultaneously tests the twelve potential scenarios for 
feasibility. Comparisons of net returns are made using a SERF, SDRF, and stoplight 
chart, a CDF, and a simple output comparison. The output comparison compares means, 
standard deviations, minimums, and maximums from all twelve enterprises. Since CRP 
enrollment is the subject of this study, the comparison chart highlights any amount in the 
mean or maximum row that is greater than the CRP mean or maximum, respectively. It 
is assumed that for all tests considering owned land, the land debt is paid in full. Since 
the Dallam farm does not currently have CRP enrollment listed, the test will assume that 
the producer is newly enrolling in CRP. Since there is no indication of CRP enrollment 
in the summary, an EBI was estimated for the producer.  
The EBI estimator allows the user to enter his/her data to estimate their EBI to 
provide insight into the odds of selection for CRP. In section one of the wildlife score, 
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wildlife habitat cover benefits, the producer enrolls all 450 acres in, “Existing stand or 
planting mixed stand (minimum of five species) of at least three native grasses and at 
least one shrub, forb, or legume species best suited for wildlife in the area, totaling fifty 
points. Wildlife enhancement, section 2, assumes, “Conversion of at least 51 percent of a 
primarily monoculture stand to a mixture of native species that provides wildlife 
benefits,” and is worth 20 points. In section three of the wildlife score, the test assumes, 
“At least 51 percent of land qualifies as a Wildlife Priority Zone,” worth 30 points.  
Part B. of the EBI is the Water Quality Score. Section one assumes, “At least 
51% of land qualifies as an approved water quality zone,” and is worth 30 points 
towards the EBI. Section two, groundwater quality, assumes an FSA assigned score of 
12, which is worth 12 points. Section three, surface water quality, assumes an FSA 
assigned score of 2, which is worth two points. 
The Erosion Factor is Part C and assumes average erodibility which is worth 50 
points towards the overall EBI. Part D., Enduring Benefits, assumes that, based on the 
chosen CRP practice, there are no enduring benefits and therefore scores zero points 
towards the overall EBI.  
Part E. of the EBI estimator, Air Quality Benefits, has four sections. Section one, 
wind erosion impacts, assumes an average wind erosion impact, worth twelve and a half 
points. Section two, the wind erosion soils list, assumes that, “Less than fifty-one percent 
of land is comprised of predominantly volcanic or organic soils,” which is worth zero 
points. Section three, air quality zone, assumes that, “Less than fifty-one percent of land 
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is in an air quality zone,” which is worth zero points, and section four, carbon 
sequestration assumes both, “Permanent wildlife habitat (corridors), non-easement and 
Permanent wildlife habitat, non-easement,” and, “Permanent introduced grasses and 
legumes, and Establishment of permanent native grasses,” which combined are worth 
three and a half points.  
The final portion of the EBI takes into account the producer’s per acre dollar bid 
to enroll in CRP. The producer’s bid is weighed against a maximum payment rate that is 
established by NRCS and FSA. The EBI/Bid comparison table, shown below in Table 
4.1 compares potential bids against the EBI scores that bid level is worth, and whether or 
not the bid would be eligible under the CRP general signup forty-five EBI score of 209. 
The test of the model assumes a bid price of $47.50; the maximum bid that would be 
accepted based on the producer’s other environmental factors in the EBI estimator.  
Each part of the EBI can be changed by the decision aid user based on 
information from NRCS. Erosion measures are different for different areas of the state or 
country. The decision aid is customized in this way for users in generating their own 
estimate of CRP acceptance.  
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 The Dallam county farm has irrigated wheat information on record, and the EBI 
calculator uses data from that portion of representative farm history as historic input for 
yields when forecasting production. There are no cattle listed for the Dallam county 
representative farm. To test the model on the cow-calf enterprise it was assumed that 
twenty-five bred heifers were purchased, with stochastic calving rates and sale weights 
of offspring. The Hunting returns were calculated using estimates assumed by the 
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“producer”. A daily lease fee of $50, a 40 day hunting season, two simultaneous hunters, 
and a minimum, middle, and maximum “days hunted” of zero percent, ten percent, and 
twenty-five percent of the possible hunting days, respectively, were assumed. The 
calculator also assumes that an irrigated well was already on the farm and operational, 
and that the land was already fenced.  
Output 
Each of the twelve crops was simulated over the period of 2015-2019, and the 
cumulative net present value (NPV) and an annual estimate of that figure (PYNPV) were 
calculated. The following are a series of outputs generated by the model designed to aid 
the producer in the final enrollment decision. All figures are calculated on a per acre 
basis, and are an average of the NPV over five years (PYNPV).  
Figure 4.1 is a CDF comparison of the twelve enterprise options available under 
this decision aid, with the previously stated data entered.  
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 The CRP/Hunting Combo option does not have the highest maximum value; 
however it does have the highest mean per acre returns. The shape of the CDFs also 
indicates that there is significantly less variability under the CRP/Hunting Combo option 
than the other eleven enterprises. The decreased variability is due to the fact that CRP 
payments are constant, and the only variation the model calculates comes from hunting 
revenues which are added to the CRP payment. The options to produce irrigated crops 
tend to do the worst overall (irrigated hay and wheat), while dryland crops have the 
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widest variability on annual returns per acre. 
 
The stoplight chart (Figure 4.2) contains each option’s probability of a “good” or 
“bad” outcome. Since this study is based on deciding whether or not to enroll in CRP, 
the upper boundary, which is the “good” case is equal to the producer’s bid, in this case 
$47.50. The lower bound, which is analogous to a bad outcome, is $0.00. There are three 
options that have zero probability of negative returns. These include the CRP option, the 
dryland hay option, and the dryland sorghum option. The same information can also be 
seen in Figure 4.1, as all three of these options’ CDFs fall entire on the right side of the 
y-axis, designating a 100% chance of positive returns. There are two options that have 
entirely “bad” outcomes; irrigated hay and irrigated wheat each have 100% probability 
of achieving negative returns.  
There are nine scenarios with possible returns greater than $47.50, including the 
CRP/Hunting combo, dryland corn, dryland cotton, dryland sorghum, irrigated corn, 
irrigated cotton, and irrigated sorghum. Dryland corn and dryland sorghum have a 
greater than 50% chance of netting over $47.50, making them the most promising 
options to replace CRP under this test’s assumptions. The CDFs in Figure 4.1 shows that 
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approximately 30% of the time dryland corn and dryland sorghum perform better than 
CRP. 
 
The SDRF analysis shows pairwise comparisons of the enterprise options under 
different risk aversion coefficients (RAC). The lower RAC for this test was set at zero, 
while the upper RAC was calculated using the ending net worth of the scenarios. The 
CRP/Hunting combo is the most preferred choice under both RACs, with irrigated wheat 
being the least preferred option under both RACs.  
The analysis under both RACs produce similar results, with CRP/Hunting and 
dryland enterprises as the most preferred options, and the irrigated enterprise options the 
least preferred, with the cow-calf enterprise falling in the middle. Options six through 
nine differ between RACs. These enterprises include cow-calf, dryland cotton, irrigated 
sorghum, and irrigated corn. When looking at the CDFs in Figure 4.1, those four options 
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are in the central group, and cross over each other around .5. This shows that under 
differing attitudes towards risk, these options will vary in their preference. 
 
While the SDRF analysis compares discrete pairwise options, SERF compares 
continuous options, assuming the same shape utility function for each enterprise, in this 
case a negative exponential utility function. Once again, Figure 4.3 shows that CRP is 
the best option under this test. The findings of SERF confirm that there are no significant 
changes in rankings across the enterprises when analyzed in a continuous setting as 
opposed to the SDRFs discrete setting.  
Table 4.3 was developed specifically for the decision aid. It is a comparison chart 
of each enterprise’s means, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum values. The 
chart in the aid is all on the same set of rows, however Table 4.3 was split in two to 
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increase it’s clarity for this paper. 
 
The purpose of the comparison table is to help producers establish a minimum 
bid threshold. The highlighted value under the CRP/Hunting combo option is the mean 
net returns from CRP/Hunting. Any option taken in lieu of CRP/Hunting combo should 
have a value at least that high, or higher. This would return a highlighted cell in the 
mean row for the other enterprises. Under the decision aid testing conditions, this did not 
occur.  
Another potential method of evaluating the bid price could be to look at the 
maximum values for each enterprise. Table 4.3 is designed to take that “maximum-
maximum” approach into account. The maximum returns achieved by the CRP/Hunting 
combo are $65.14. For a producer to choose another enterprise based on this option the 
maximum net returns would have to exceed that dollar amount. A value higher than the 
CRP/hunting option occurs seven times. The maximum return achieved by dryland corn, 
dryland cotton, dryland sorghum, dryland wheat, irrigated corn, irrigated cotton, and 
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irrigated sorghum exceed the returns from CRP/Hunting combo, although dryland wheat 
only exceed the returns by approximately $2.00 per acre.  
The decision aid generates estimated returns to production options specified by 
the user. the results are displayed to take into account risk in yields, prices, and net 
returns. Alternative rental rates can be specified to examine various CRP bids and the 
effect of those bids on the EBI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 80 
 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The Agricultural Act of 2014 mandates an 8 million acre reduction for CRP over 
the life of the bill. This fact combined with the rapidly approaching general signup 
period make evaluating land-use options important to producers. Incorporating risk in to 
a decision about future land use can enhance a farmer’s ability to make sound financial 
decisions. The primary goal of this research was to develop a computer decision aid 
model that would provide producers with a method to evaluate five land use options 
based on their chosen inputs.  
 The land use options evaluated by the decision aid model were enrollment (or re-
enrollment) in CRP combined with hunting returns, ten different cropping options, a 
cow-calf enterprise. Using a farm in Dallam County, Texas, an Environmental Benefits 
Index score was estimated, and several scenarios were simulated under different 
assumptions about the producer’s management choices. The choices were each ranked 
using four methods; a cumulative distribution function, the stoplight ranking method 
stochastic dominance with respect to a function, and stochastic efficiency with respect to 
a function. Each of these are available to a producer using the aid.   
 CRP/Hunting was the most preferred alternative based on all ranking options, 
unless the decision is based on maximum potential returns, which is not typically a 
sound decision making method. This is a reasonable conclusion as enrollment in CRP at 
any given bid has no variability and can be viewed as a sure investment opportunity with 
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a known stream of returns. The other enterprises were variable in their ranking 
depending on the method used.  
 It is important to remember that this was only a test based on one test farm, and 
not an actual recommendation in general. With that in mind, under all but the most 
optimistic outlooks, CRP/Hunting is the recommended choice based on this test. It has 
the lowest level of variability, which is attractive to decision makers with a high risk 
aversion coefficient, as well as the highest mean. Depending on a producer’s attitude 
towards risk and their ability to remain solvent given a poor outcome, dryland corn, and 
particularly dryland sorghum could compete with CRP/Hunting. Based on this test 
example dryland sorghum has no likelihood of negative net returns, which may be 
unrealistic, and realizes a potentially much higher net return than CRP/Hunting. Dryland 
corn has the drawback of potential negative returns making it a less attractive, but still 
possible choice over CRP/Hunting.   
 This test has several limiting factors. The Texas A&M AgriLife Extension 
budgets used to evaluate expenses for each option are generalized for a region, and will 
vary by landowner, and across different regions of the state. Individualization of each 
budget for each unique situation will yield more accurate estimates. The correct decision 
may be dependent on other factors that cannot be economically analyzed. This model 
only produces a recommendation, not a final rule on the decision. Attitudes towards 
production could influence the decision of whether or not to enroll in a set-aside 
program like CRP.  Research also indicates that age may play a role in the enrollment 
decision.  
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 Several improvements could be made to this model. The first is to incorporate a 
decreased productivity rate in the first year or two of the cropping options if the land is 
broken out of CRP. The literature shows that this is typical, and this could impact the net 
returns to cropping options. The wheat enterprise should also include a cattle stocker 
operation. This was not programmed into the model, however the cow-calf and wheat 
system typically work as a system together, and that could potentially make the wheat 
and cow-calf options more attractive. In the future, the analysis should be extended to 
ten years, as that is the typical life of a CRP contract, and it would yield more realistic 
results. The EBI calculator can also be improved upon, particularly in the calculation of 
air quality improvements, water quality, and the erosion factor section. The data and 
calculation for these sections are not readily available, or necessarily easy for a farmer to 
enter, but their improvement will help make the aid more efficient. A potential next step 
for this analysis is to incorporate the CRP decision into a whole-farm analysis, searching 
for an optimal level of CRP land to incorporate into a farming system.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
  Table A.1 Cover Practices (CP) for the N1a Criteria 
   (Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) Fact 
Sheet, 2013) 
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Table A.2 Practices for the N1b Criteria 
(Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) Fact 
Sheet, 2013) 
 
 
 
Table A.3 Erodibility Index Points 
(Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) Fact 
Sheet, 2013) 
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Table A.4 Practices for the N4 Criteria 
(Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) Fact 
Sheet, 2013) 
 
 
Table A.5 Air Quality 
(Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) Fact 
Sheet, 2013) 
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Table A.6 Offer Less than Maximum Payment Rate 
(Conservation Reserve Program Sign-Up 45 Environmental Benefits Index (EBI) Fact 
Sheet, 2013) 
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